Situating Manuel Castells's three-volume work, The Information Age, within a broad tradition of classical social theory that has sought to come to terms with the emergence of new forms of social, economic and cultural life, critical consideration is given to a series of concerns, including questions of analytic perspective and in particular the relevance of the work of Marx; the concept of the network society; the movement from production to consumption as the primary medium through which individuals are engaged within contemporary society; and issues of identity and community. In contrast to Castells's identification of an ethical foundation or spirit of informationalism, it is argued that an aesthetics of consumption is central to modern society in its informational capitalist phase and that as society has become more exposed to the consequences of informationalism and the associated globalization of capital, the prospect of living in an ethically responsible manner has diminished significantly.
some of the themes to be explored at length in The Information Age, Castells remarks that:
. . . the grand theories which explicitly and implicitly have produced the categories with which we still, inadequately, think our world, will have proved to be completely obsolete. The ruins of Marxism are already of no use to us, not even as points of reference, because the problems signified by its concepts do not correspond to the main themes of the new human experience. (1992: 94-5) The metaphor of 'ruins' may seem highly appropriate for a paradigm which has been burdened with analytically sterile 'architectural' notions of 'base'/'foundations' and 'superstructure'. However, it is necessary to question whether ruins are really all that remain of Marxism. As a political doctrine Marxism has been exposed to the judgement of history and it has failed the test. Likewise, Marx's incomplete analysis of social class has proved difficult to reconcile with the complexity and increasing diversity of modern human experience, identity and associated expressions of communal belonging. But in response it might be argued that the remaining analytic value of Marx's work lies elsewhere, specifically in the provision of a detailed investigation of a powerful and historically specific mode of economic production, capitalism, a dynamic mode of production to which human existence is now more, rather than less, subject. Contrary to Castells's remark, a number of the general processes and problems signified by Marx's concepts continue to be of relevance to an understanding of significant aspects of the new circumstances which we encounter, although supplementation and reformulation is, not surprisingly, necessary to take account of the specific features of the transformed historical conditions we now face.
Consider the following familiar examples, familiar in the dual sense that they are fairly well-known features of Marx's thought and increasingly common aspects of human experience, indeed probably far more so now than when they were first presented.
1 Constant revolutions in the mode of production and exchange constitute an intrinsic feature of modern capitalism's culture of creative destruction, and 'uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, [and] everlasting uncertainty and agitation', represent necessary consequences to which modern subjects are increasingly exposed. 2 Global diffusion of capitalism and a continual pursuit of expanding markets
give 'a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country'. 'In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal interdependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production.' Products of such new industries are 'consumed . . . in every quarter of the globe'. 3 The periodic return of economic crises constitutes an inevitable consequence of capitalism -arising from the competitive (over)development of productive forces within capitalist property relations (Marx and Engels, 1968 [1848] : 81-6). 4 As capitalism develops, wealth production comes to depend less on 'labour time and the amount of labour employed' and more on the application of science and technology to production, that is on the way in which science is 'pressed into the service of capital'. (Marx, 1973 (Marx, [1857 : 704-5)
The identification and analysis of problems and processes such as these, far from being of 'no use, even as points of reference', continue to contribute to contemporary understandings of social and economic life and provide points of reference, if not the provisional outline of a cognitive map, with which to begin to explore important aspects of the complex shifting terrain of the information age. Of course much has changed and it may be argued that it is now necessary to recognize that there has been a significant change of emphasis and influence away from the institutions of work, employment and production and towards practices of consumption and consumer choice in the constitution of social life and expressions of identity. In short, that ours is indeed a consumer society, one in which there has been a diminution of the work ethic and a concomitant promotion of an 'aesthetic of consumption' (Bauman, 1998) . However, as Castells acknowledges, behind the appeal of consumerism there remains the corporate ethos of accumulation and capitalism continuing to operate 'as the dominant economic form ' (1996: 198) . It is an economic form that is now truly global in scope, but one that is inherently flawed and remains subject to recurring crisis (Soros, 1998b) . It is an economic system that is continually transforming itself, one in which, Castells argues, the unit of economic organization is now the network. However, it remains an economic system that produces extremes of deprivation and debt, and in consequence forms of exclusion, alongside excessive wealth and more modest forms of economic well-being that are necessary for participation in the perceived benefits of consumerism and consumer life-styles.
In The Information Age Castells offers little clarification of his analytic perspective; on the contrary, what is provided on the subject of perceptions of reality raises rather than resolves questions. For example, in a discussion of the emergence of a new culture, 'the culture of real virtuality', Castells remarks that there can be 'no separation between "reality" and symbolic representation ' (1996: 372) . This is a relatively uncontroversial comment, one that affirms the centrality of a symbolic environment, the necessarily coded character of reality, the inescapable constitutive presence of language. In short, as Castells affirms, '[a]ll realities are communicated through symbols ' (1996: 373) . Such an appreciation of the encoded character of all realities is, however, difficult to reconcile with Castells's later proposal that 'after exploring our world, I shall try to make sense of it ' (1998: 3) . To be able to explore 'our world', that is to examine and investigate it, the analyst has of necessity to already be in possession of some sense of that world. The explored world is already constituted in some form, made available through conceptualization for examination and investigation. The process of making sense is not an independent sequel to the activity of exploration. Inconsistencies such as this make it difficult to determine precisely where Castells stands analytically.
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In so far as some of the key aspects of human experience continue to be closely articulated with processes analysed by Marx, the dismissal of Marxism as being of 'no use' is difficult to understand. It is also hard to reconcile such a judgement with the traces of Marxism which remain in the explorations conducted by Castells.
The suspicion of analytic remains from the 'ruins' of Marxism receives confirmation from a number of statements made by Castells, but is perhaps best exemplified by the observation offered in the conclusion to the three volumes, namely that the 'material basis that explains why real virtuality is able to take over people's imagination and systems of representation is their livelihood in the space of flows and timeless time ' (1998: 350, emphases added) . But while statements such as these provide appropriate recognition of the importance of global capital flows and changes in relationships of production to the transformation of social life -in Castells's terms the emergence of a network society -no single element or process appears to be explicitly accorded primacy in the transformations identified.
The 'new world' described by Castells is said to originate in:
the historical coincidence, around the late 1960s and mid-1970s, of three independent processes: the information technology revolution; the economic crisis of both capitalism and statism, and their subsequent restructuring; and the blooming of cultural social movements . . . The interaction between these processes and the reactions they triggered brought into being a new dominant social structure, the network society; a new economy, the informational/global economy; and a new culture, the culture of real virtuality. (1998: 336) The independence of the three processes identified is, however, more controversial than Castells allows, for it is the prompting and investing of capital interested in making 'the creation of wealth independent (relatively) of the labour time employed on it' (Marx, 1973: 706; see also Harvey, 1989, and Poster, 1990 for related discussions of this issue) that has contributed powerfully to what has been identified as the information technology revolution. Furthermore, the related cultural social movements identified appear in Castells's own narrative as direct and indirect responses and resistances to capitalist restructuring. To respond critically in these terms is not to suggest that everything can be reduced simply to an effect of capital, but it is to call into question the independence ascribed to the processes identified. It is structural transformations in the relationships of production, power and experience respectively, and their complex articulations, which Castells (1998: 340) argues account for the emergence of a new society. But the relationships between these complex structural transformations are far from clear. To proceed further clarification is necessary of the new social structure, the network society, and the respective relationships of production, power and experience.
The Network Society
A concept of network is central to the thesis Castells presents and the term appears in a multitude of contexts. For example, reference is made to networks Barry Smart New Times? of trade and investment, production and management and cooperation; to interpersonal, social and communication networks; as well as to an interactive network, global network, internet network and network state. The network society is portrayed as the new social structure and there are many other references to micro-networks, sub-networks, an inter-metropolitan network, world medical network, narcotics network and even a 'network of networks'. The concept itself is by no means new and if 'network' simply signifies the existence of complex interconnections, or circuits, between social, economic and political phenomena, then it represents a far from novel condition.
Precisely what Castells means by the notion of network and how he deploys the term are matters that warrant further examination. An attempt to explicitly define the term comes quite late in Volume I. Castells states:
A network is a set of interconnected nodes. A node is the point at which a curve intersects itself. What a node is, concretely speaking, depends upon the kind of concrete networks of which we speak. They are stock exchange markets, and their ancillary advanced services centers, in the network of global financial flows. They are national councils of ministers and European Commissioners in the political network that governs the European Union. They are coca fields and poppy fields, clandestine laboratories, secret landing strips, street gangs and money-laundering financial institutions, in the network of drug traffic . . . They are television systems, entertainment studios, computer graphics milieux . . . in the global network of the new media. (1996: 470) Evidently networks are now to be found everywhere, but does this signify a qualitative socio-economic transformation, or merely a change of scale?
Implied throughout in references to networks of various kinds is the emergence and impact of an 'information technology paradigm', described by Castells as 'the material foundation of the informational society' (1996: 61 emphases added), or 'network society' as it is alternatively described. Acknowledging a possible interpretation to which such a statement is vulnerable, Castells subsequently cautions that 'the information society [network society] is not the superstructure of a new technological paradigm' (1998: 67, emphasis added; see also 239). This constitutes a reminder of an earlier warning, notably that 'I do not share a traditional view of society as made up of superimposed levels, with technology and economy in the basement, power on the mezzanine, and culture in the penthouse' (Castells, 1996: 27) . Notwithstanding such disclaimers the strong impression persists throughout the three volumes that it is a process of capital-driven techno-economic globalization which continues to bear most responsibility for powerfully reshaping our world, and that analytically priority is effectively being accorded to the 'emergence of a new mode of development, informationalism, historically shaped by the restructuring of the capitalist mode of production towards the end of the twentieth century' (1996: 14, emphases added). It is worth stressing here, as Castells (1996: 16-18) has to acknowledge, that the historical emergence of new modes of development has from the very outset been an integral feature of the modern capitalist mode of production.
When Castells comments that a new social structure 'is associated' with the
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forces of informationalism and the social relations of a globalized capitalist system of production, it is merely the complexity of the forms of articulation between the respective elements which is signified. However, while there appears to be a reluctance to accord informational or networked capitalism any analytic primacy, the argument provided tells a somewhat different tale. The network society is very much a capitalist society and there is a necessary acknowledgement that now, 'for the first time in history, the capitalist mode of production shapes social relationships over the entire planet' (Castells, 1996: 471) . Contemporary capitalism is global and, as Castells remarks, capital is 'realized, invested, and accumulated mainly in the sphere of circulation, that is as finance capital ' (1996: 471) . Increasingly the action that matters occurs on information-networked global financial markets; it is here in the virtual realm of constant financial flows that the destinies of nations, corporations, households and individuals are largely determined: 'in the age of networked capitalism the fundamental reality, where money is made and lost . . . is in the financial sphere' (Castells, 1996: 472) . Such financial flows of capital are not, it is argued, under the control of a global capitalist class, indeed Castells remarks that sociologically and economically there is now no such thing, although there is 'an integrated global capitalist network, whose movements and variable logic ultimately determine economies and influence societies'. In short there is a 'faceless collective capitalist, made up of financial flows operated by electronic networks ' (1996: 474) . The metaphor of the hidden hand of the market, to which Castells (1996: 195) makes brief reference, is not too helpful here, for such a notion generally signifies equilibrium and control, rather than the turbulence and unpredictability to which networked capitalism and those exposed to it, now virtually all of us, winners and losers alike, are so vulnerable. As Castells comments, networked capitalism not only produces its own forms of inequality, poverty and social exclusion, its 'electronically managed global capital markets are at the source of new forms of devastating economic crises, looming into the twenty-first century ' (1996: 437; see also 1998: 162) .
The instability and unpredictability which is a corollary of information networked global financial markets is also emphasised by George Soros (1997 Soros ( : 1998a Soros ( : 1998b . Soros is primarily concerned to draw attention to the capitalist threat confronting the open society. In the course of his argument he makes several references to the reflexivity between thought and its subject matter, between thinking and social reality, and the particular significance of this relationship in respect of financial markets which are predicated on 'expectations about events that are shaped by those expectations ' (1997: 6) . Within informational global capitalism, where 'financial flows [are] operated by electronic networks' (Castells 1996: 474) , the relationship of reflexivity between thought and economic reality is both particularly important and potentially problematic, for economic activity is increasingly, and frequently unpredictably, affected by, if not constituted as, a hermeneutic spiral of expectations, decisions and events. Within such a networked capitalism, one by implication in which responsibility (dis)appears, to be(come) increasingly faceless, what are the prospects for ethics? What place, if any, is there for a sense of ethical responsibility?
Ethical Foundations
Questions of ethics and responsibility are for the most part tangential to Castells's analysis. However, in attempting to account for the emergence of a 'new paradigm of economic organisation', Castells acknowledges the potential guideline value of Weber's familiar analysis of the cultural and institutional configuration associated with the emergence of modern capitalism, and proceeds to make reference to a potential 'spirit of informationalism ' (1996: 195) .
The focus of Weber's analysis is the cultural background of ideas and practices from which emerged the pursuit of profit as a calling 'toward which the individual feels himself to have an ethical obligation ' (1976: 75) . It is the ethical foundation and justification of a 'peculiarly calculating sort of profit-seeking' conduct with which Weber was concerned (1976: 55) . The calculating profit-seeking conduct identified remains the driving force of contemporary capitalism, although, as Weber noted in his concluding remarks, it has long since ceased to need an ethical foundation, or an 'idea of duty in one's calling ' (1976: 182) . Wealth creation, as it is now frequently described, has seemingly become its own virtue, an end in itself; it has assumed, in Weber's words, the 'character of sport', or has become associated with 'mundane passions' (p. 182), in particular with an apparently insatiable desire for forms of conspicuous consumption. Curiously, Castells does not in practice seem to be guided by Weber's discussion of the displacement, or erosion, of the ethical foundations of capitalist economic conduct, and he also neglects to consider the possible implications of the advent of a consumer society and the increasing prominence of cultures of consumption, although there is a very brief passing reference to 'the renewed appeal of consumerism ' (1996: 198) .
Several elements are identified by Castells which might together be considered to account for 'the cultural sustainment of renewed capitalist competition', but such elements as 'the corporate ethos of accumulation [and] . . . consumerism' are argued to be unable to account for the new agent, 'the network enterprise', which serves to distinguish contemporary capitalism from earlier forms (1996: 198) . A distinctive ethical foundation or 'spirit of informationalism' is considered to provide the cultural milieu for the network form of organization. But while it is understandable that Castells should seek to uncover or identify the cultural dimension articulated with the network form of organization, there is no warrant for assuming that this constitutes an ethical foundation which bears comparison with the spirit of capitalism identified by Weber. As I have noted, Weber recognized that 'this support had long since ceased to be necessary for modern capitalism', which had become 'exceptionally emancipated from the importance of such ethical factors ' (1978: 1125) . Contemporary capitalism, that is network or informational capitalism in the terms employed by Castells, is a mode of production within which it is not simply the case that industry, employment and work have
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been transformed under the impact of information technologies introduced into factories, offices and services; in addition, the meaning and significance of work in people's lives have changed. Whereas modern society in its industrial capitalist phase can be appropriately described as a producer society, a society that 'engaged its members primarily as producers', in its informational capitalist phase, or what Bauman terms its 'late-modern, second-modern or post-modern stage', society engages its members somewhat differently, 'primarily in their capacity as consumers ' (1998: 24) . A corollary of the transformed relationship and relative significance of production and consumption in the ordering of social life implied in the notion of a movement from producer to consumer society is a waning of the work ethic and a parallel provocation of the desire to consume. In short, rather than ethics it is aesthetics that is integral to consumer society. It is, as Bauman argues, 'the aesthetics of consumption that now rules where the work ethic once ruled ' (1998: 32) . Given the evidence of such radically transformed circumstances, in particular the 'growing prominence of the culture of consumption' (Featherstone 1991: 13), it is surprising that Castells does not offer any sustained analysis of consumerism and that of the three volumes on economy, culture and society barely ten pages are devoted to issues of consumption. In view of the above it might be argued that rather than fabricating an ethical foundation for the new economic agent, the network enterprise, it would be more appropriate to be critically analysing the ways in which informationalism and an associated increase in the concentration and globalization of capital have served to further diminish the prospect of living in an ethically responsible manner (Smart, 1999) .
According to Castells the new 'basic unit of economic organization is not a subject ' (1996: 198) , individual or collective; rather the network is the key unit and a distinctive cultural milieu is deemed to be a necessary corollary of such a networking organizational form. However, there is no assumption of a new unifying network culture; rather, there is said to be a common cultural code. But what precisely does Castells have in mind by such a code? The answer is a virtual culture, that is composed of:
. . . many cultures, many values, many projects, that cross through the minds and inform the strategies of the various participants in the networks, changing at the same pace as the network's members, and following the organizational and cultural transformation of the units of the network. It is a culture . . . of each strategic decision, a patchwork of experiences and interests, rather than a charter of rights and obligations. It is . . . a material force because it informs, and enforces, powerful economic decisions at every moment in the life of the network. But it does not stay long: it goes into the computer's memory as raw material of past successes and failures. The network enterprise learns to live within this virtual culture. Any attempt at crystallizing the position in the network as a cultural code in a particular time and space sentences the network to obsolescence, since it becomes too rigid for the variable geometry required for informationalism. The 'spirit of informationalism' is the culture of 'creative destruction' accelerated to the speed of the optoelectronic circuits that process its signals. (1996: 199) However, as I have noted above, 'a culture of creative destruction' was recognized as a distinguishing feature of capitalist modernity in the mid-nineteenth century (Marx and Engels, 1968) , which suggests that rather than the emergence of a new culture or spirit, what we are witnessing now is the continuing development of capitalism, albeit increasingly informational in its operation, and an associated dramatic acceleration in both the pace and rate of transformation of social, cultural and economic life.
Notwithstanding such references to the importance of a common cultural code, it is work which remains at the core of social structure for Castells, with changes in work and production being identified as the lever 'by which the informational paradigm and the process of globalization affect society at large ' (1996: 201) . In other associated passages Castells seems to come close to espousing a form of technological determinism, for example when arguing that a 'historical redefinition of the relationship between capital and labor' was made possible through 'the use of powerful information technologies and . . . organizational forms facilitated by the new technological medium ' (1996: 278) . In so far as it is primarily the historically determining role of networked capitalism and information technology which receive emphasis, the prospects for a re-ethicalization of social and economic life are effectively marginalized. The new social order, described by Castells as the network society, not only assumes the form of 'a meta-social disorder ' (1996: 477) , increasingly it seems to be experienced as such, and in these circumstances the prospect of recognizing and exercising moral responsibility appears to be remote.
Late Modern Identity
While informational capitalism powerfully influences conduct and experience, not all aspects of social life submit to the logic of the network society. There are contradictions, conflicts and resistances involving social movements and cultural projects constituted in terms of identity, which have emerged to 'challenge globalization and cosmopolitanism on behalf of cultural singularity and people's control over their lives and environment' (Castells 1997:2) . The multiple sources of resistance will, Castells remarks, eventually transform the process of 'technoeconomic globalization shaping our world ' (1997: 3) . In fact there is no need for such speculative prophecy to support the idea of resistance, for the process of globalization has from the outset been subject to the resistance and transformative capacity, or potential, of local contexts, with their specific cultures, histories and geographies.
Late modernity, according to Castells, is reaching its end and with it the dynamics of identity are changing. To emphasize the distinctiveness of identity construction within the emerging network society Castells contrasts his analysis with a version of reflexive identity formation attributed to Anthony Giddens. The argument advanced is that in making reference to the ways in which social life is increasingly 'reconstituted in terms of the dialectical interplay of the local and the global', Giddens (1991:5) appears to neglect frictions, conflicts, adaptations and accommodations between local and global influences. In particular, Giddens is criticized for assuming both the universality of life-style negotiation in late modern conditions and an associated capacity on the part of subjects to reflexively organize life-planning, which is, in its turn, regarded as a constitutive feature of self-identity. The position taken by Castells is that these assumptions no longer hold, for 'the network society is based on the systemic disjunction between the local and the global for most individuals and social groups ' (1997: 11) . The contrast constructed is ultimately unconvincing, however, for if the analysis of self and identity in late modernity offered by Giddens is considered in more appropriate detail it soon becomes clear that the discussion offered of the dialectical interplay of the local and the global actually anticipates and incorporates the very concerns subsequently articulated by Castells.
For example, in exploring a number of dilemmas or tribulations confronting the late modern self Giddens states that 'the emergence of globalised connections . . . represent parameters of social life over which the situated individual has relatively little control' and, in turn, that a significant number of the associated 'processes transformed by disembedding, or reorganised in the light of the intrusion of abstract systems, move beyond the purview of the situated actor' (Giddens, 1991: 192, emphases added) . In short, the local-global interplay identified by Giddens is more complex and uneven than Castells appears ready to recognize.
Reflexive life-planning, as Castells views it, is only possible for an elite; for the rest of us it is a matter of searching for 'meaning . . . in the reconstruction of defensive identities around communal principles ' (1997: 11) . The problem here is that Castells confuses practice and process with outcome. To identify reflexively organized life-planning as a distinguishing feature of the structuring of modern self-identity is not to imply that life-plans are realized. What Giddens calls the 'threat of meaninglessness' is perpetually haunting modern existence. In short, the 'reflexive project of the self takes place against a background of the prevalence of internally referential systems . . . [and such a project] has to be undertaken in circumstances which limit personal engagement with some of the most fundamental issues that human existence poses for all of us' (Giddens, 1991: 201) . Reflexive life-planning does not necessarily mean greater control over one's fate. Castells (1997) argues that in the new conditions of the network society identity is increasingly constructed on the basis of local 'communal resistance' to the disenfranchising consequences of 'globalization and informationalization'. The pursuit of 'meaning' is held to take the form of a 'reconstruction of defensive identities around communal principles' (Castells 1997: 11) . There is clearly a substantial body of contemporary material on which to draw in support of such a thesis, but Etzioni's communitarian analysis is a problematic source, for the emphasis in his work is not, as Castells (1997: 9, 60) suggests, on the formation of local communities of resistance, but ultimately on the virtues of more widely shared values, on the importance of maintaining a 'supracommunity', a national unity, specifically 'American society as a community of communities' (Etzioni, 1993: 152, 156; Smart, 1999) .
Castells identifies significant instances of collective identity construction which have arisen in relation to religious fundamentalism, nationalism, ethnicity, and territoriality. Such examples effectively illustrate some of the ways in which identity is constituted through forms of communal resistance, but there are other forms of meaning-seeking and identity construction which while communal, or to be more precise 'tribal' (Maffesoli, 1996) , are not necessarily expressions of resistance to the forces analysed by Castells. One notable omission to which I have already referred is any consideration of the complex ways in which identity construction occurs in the sphere of consumption and leisure, and as a corollary, the ways in which consumer life-styles may constitute a basis for virtual collective identities (Kellner, 1992) . And given the focus on informationalization and the recognition given to the way in which 'societies are constituted by the interaction between the "net" and the "self "' (Castells, 1998: 352) it is surprising that no sustained consideration is given to the impact of cultures of the internet on identity formation (Shields, 1996) . There is a striking imbalance in the discussion of the local community as a basis of resistance to 'the process of individualization and social atomization' (Castells, 1997: 60) . Castells places emphasis on the virtues of local communities as 'defensive reactions against the impositions of global disorder ' (1997: 64) , but this is only a part of a far more complex and potentially troubling story. The defensive reactions of local communities can in turn produce forms of disorder both locally and globally, as events in the late 1990s in the Balkans demonstrate. The constitution of local bonds and affinities, the process of inclusion of people within a community, simultaneously produces forms of exclusion, people who do not belong, those who are not considered to share a particular communal cultural identity. The constitution of locally-based identity, a feeling of belonging or the sense of being an insider, simultaneously produces, in and for others, a sense of detachment and feelings of difference, and creates outsiders and strangers, if not enemies (Bauman, 1995) . Local communities may constitute defensive identities against unpredictable, uncontrollable and unknown global flows, but they may also represent offensive identities against other excluded constituencies. As Etzioni recognizes in his reflections on the risks associated with the proliferation of subcultures and communities in America, it was the erosion of overarching values and bonds and the priority accorded to group loyalties and local community identities 'that sent Yugoslavia into civil war in 1991, that endangers Canadian society, and that threatens Indian society and many others ' (1993: 156) .
From the 'Open' to the 'Exposed' Society
The argument presented in The Information Age is that we are witnessing the emergence of a new society, a network society. It is indisputable that our world is being transformed in significant ways by '[g]lobalization and informationalization, enacted by networks of wealth, technology and power' (Castells 1997: 68) . However, it is less clear that the 'network society' is the most appropriate and inclusive concept with which to signify the character and consequences of the European Journal of Social Theory 3(1) transformations under way. While a substantial proportion of the world's population is affected directly and indirectly by informationalism and globalization, a large proportion is simultaneously marginalized, 'dubbed as irrelevant from the perspective of dominant interests', and in consequence switched off from 'the networks of power and wealth' (Castells, 1998: 1) . Such subjects are forced to exist outside the network society, they are the victims of social exclusion, and they are to be found around the globe, in 'every country, and every city', as Castells (1998: 164) is compelled to acknowledge.
Soros, reflecting on the global capitalist system and, in particular, the globalization of financial markets which has 'accelerated in recent years to the point where movements in exchange rates, interest rates, and stock prices in various countries are intimately interconnected ' (1998a: 20) , has identified a growing threat to the values and institutions of the open society. Five main deficiencies of global capitalism are identified, notably the 'uneven distribution of benefits'; the instability of financial markets; the 'incipient threat of global monopolies and oligopolies'; the declining influence of the state; and the loss, or undermining, of shared values and erosion of social cohesion. A number of these deficiencies are recognized by Castells, who notes that globalization and informationalization are 'disenfranchising societies' and 'disintegrating existing mechanisms of social control and political representation ' (1997: 69) .
According to the terms employed by Karl Popper, what distinguishes the open society is the existence of an 'ever-widening field of personal decisions, with its problems and possibilities ' (1969 [1945] ; 173). Popper argues that in such a society individuals are continually confronted with the necessity of making decisions, of rationally reflecting on matters affecting their existence. Reflecting on the way in which an open society is likely to lose its concrete character and become an increasingly 'abstract society', Popper speculates on the prospect of a society in which face-to-face contact is reduced, one where 'business is conducted by individuals in isolation who communicate by typed letters or by telegrams, and who go about in closed motor cars. (Artificial insemination would allow even propagation without a personal element) ' (1969: 174) . Popper describes such a society as 'fictitious', albeit while noting that 'our modern society' shares some features of a 'completely abstract society ' (1969: 174) . Subsequently modern open societies have become far more abstract, and what is increasingly causing concern is that the field of meaningful ethico-political decision-making seems to be narrowing rather than widening. Globalization and informationalization do indeed appear to be disenfranchising the citizen, while seducing the consumer with a simulation of empowerment.
The open society is threatened by the range of developments identified by Castells, although there is no direct address of this important issue in his work. In addition to those threats and deficiencies already noted, Castells (1997) remarks on the ways in which complex processes of globalization, not only of formal capitalist economic activity, but also of media and electronic communication and crime, are undermining the sovereignty of the nation state and reducing its capacity to govern effectively. The global character and interdependence of financial and currency markets has significant implications for the economic policies of nation states, and the accelerating transnationalization of 'investment, production, and consumption' has serious consequences for 'the national basis of taxation systems' and welfare states dependent on adequate funding (Castells, 1997: 246) . The clear implication is of the greater vulnerability or exposure of nation states, but not only nation states, to the vagaries of global market forces and flows.
With the development of a globalized informational capitalism the open society has become vulnerable to a range of new risks that threaten the sovereignty, livelihood and well-being of communities and individuals. While a concept of the network society may facilitate an increased understanding of some of the consequences of the development of a globalized informational capitalism, it is not analytically effective for exploring the range of risks and threats to which social and political life, and capitalist economic activity itself, have become exposed as a consequence of globalization and informationalization. The open society, which has provided the conditions of possibility within which developments associated with the notion of network society have become possible, is now a society under threat, a society at risk. It has become a society vulnerable to the very developments identified by Castells, a society exposed to the vagaries of a globalized and informationalized capitalism.
What is represented as a new type of society, the network society, is experienced by a growing number of people as a form of life over which they seem to be able to exercise little, if any, significant influence. Social life is constituted through and as complex processes of transformation with consequent unpredictable sequences of disorganization and reorganization. As well as living with the frequently unanticipated and uncontrollable consequences of complex processes of transformation, people now live in expectation of more of the same (Smart, 1999) . In short, they live in uncertainty, as social life is exposed to new forms of risk and threat, as well as to the prospect of disorder and disorganization arising from accelerating processes of socio-economic and technological transformation. It is to an understanding of some of the key processes which have led to such conditions that The Information Age makes an important contribution, revealing in particular, if perhaps inadvertently, that an increasingly exposed society is an inescapable and disturbing corollary of a globally networked informational capitalism.
